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China Week on the BBC: The Media Making Knowledge and 
Writing History 
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Abstract: In March of 2005, the British Broadcasting Corporation ran a special week of programming about 
China in its news and current affairs services on television and radio called “China Week”. This paper argues that 
the BBC was engaged in a specific task of producing knowledge about China in which a traditional commitment to 
media objectivity conflicted with a self-conscious interpretation of China for a British audience. The paper suggests 
that in this ambiguity was a failure to understand the way the BBC was writing a Chinese history or to acknowledge 
the ideological implications of such a task. [China Media Research. 2007; 3(1):17-25]. 
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Between March 7 and 13, 2005, the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) held a “China Week”, 
a special week of programming about China, on 
television, radio and the Internet. China Week was 
made up of reports on China in newscasts and current 
affairs, screenings of documentaries, and live 
programming on television and radio from Chinese 
cities. Over sixty journalists traveled to China for the 
week, delivering dozens of hours of programming with 
the purpose of “bringing the enormous changes 
happening in China” to the attention of the British 
people.i  China Week evolved from a suggestion within 
the BBC World Service, on the periphery of the BBC’s 
structure, into a major institutional undertaking across 
all the BBC’s broadcast services.ii The different aspects 
of the BBC participated in their different ways in the 
Week so that from the World Service, China Week 
found its way through domestic radio and television to 
features on the BBC’s central flagship news programs, 
the 6 O’clock News, and late-evening current affairs 
program Newsnight.  
The process by which the Week was put together 
was ad hoc and largely uncoordinated. iii  As it 
propagated through the different sections of the BBC, 
the subject of China was incorporated into a range of 
programming styles and formats, from live coverage on 
radio, extended panel discussions on radio and 
television, and conventional news and current affairs 
reportage. The programming mostly followed the 
conventions of broadcasting. At the “entertainment” 
end, for example on Radio Five Live, the BBC’s talk 
radio network, there were live “vox pops” and 
interviews, and human-interest stories. At the “serious” 
end, for example on the Newsnight evening current 
affairs program, there were crafted reports with 
narratives of argumentation and tight structures, 
informed by “expert” opinion and journalists in the 
field. Despite the range of broadcasting formats and 
styles, China Week became a remarkably coherent and 
structured discourse of China. It tracked through five 
key identifiable themes: China’s relationship to the UK, 
its economic boom, democracy, the environment, and 
minorities. It approached each of them with the 
conventional “critical” style of media investigation, 
creating a drama out of the inherent social and political 
tensions of China’s economic boom, social changes, 
and undemocratic government.   
Although the coverage coincided with the Third 
Session of the 10th National People’s Congress in 
Beijing, the only significant China story of the week 
was the passing of the anti-succession law by the 
National People’s Congress, which escalated China-
Taiwan tension. Therefore, within its place in the 
BBC’s news programming of that week, China Week 
had the significant distinction in that it was not, strictly 
speaking, news. Instead, China Week did much more 
than simply report specific events in China as part of 
the normal news production cycle. It offered a self-
conscious commentary on China’s importance to the 
UK and to the world in a general sense: “Isn’t it time 
you got to know the world’s fastest growing 
superpower?” ran one of the promotional clips. 
Therefore, running through the specific themes was a 
broader understanding of China in terms of temporality 
- the “rise” of China - and through that a kind of 
dialectical projection of the UK’s social, political and 
economic life in relation to this new global power. The 
terms of that “importance” were highly structured and 
contingent, and in the programming overall, and indeed 
in the opening of the tag line, “Isn’t it time”, was a 
highly structured temporality to a discourse of “China”. 
 
Objectivity and knowledge 
The location of China Week within the rhetorical 
styles of conventional broadcasting and news reporting 
without actually being news exposes the discursive 
structure of those styles very neatly. It expresses a 
powerful effect of misrecognition (Bourdieu, 1991) by 
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the BBC in which China Week was offered as a 
deliberate and self-conscious interpretive and 
pedagogical approach to China while presenting its 
broadcasts as if they functioned on the conventional 
bases of the notions of objectivity and neutrality which 
inform broadcasting and news reporting. China Week, 
therefore, invoked an ambiguous form of broadcasting, 
with the conventions of journalistic objectivity coming 
up against a self-conscious narration of a discourse of 
“China”.  
Objectivity is as established an orthodoxy in the 
media as it is a dominant theme of critique in media 
studies. The self-professed purpose of journalism is to 
report “facts”, on the assumption that they can be 
understood as objective truths and conveyed with 
disinterest on the part of the journalist or broadcaster 
(Humphrys, 2005), what Gaye Tuchman described in 
the early 1970s as the “strategic ritual” of objectivity 
(Tuchman, 1972). The history of the journalistic notion 
of objectivity has been thoroughly detailed in media 
studies (see Allen, 1999) and there are also parallels 
with the development of the notion of objectivity in the 
social sciences. Although contemporary news reporting 
may often self-consciously not heed the ideal of 
objectivity, the ideal itself remains a powerful 
legitimizing regime over the work of the media.  
In the case of China Week, the BBC’s aim was to 
inform the British public as to the nature of China: 
“what life in China in 2005 is really like” (Asia Today, 
BBC News 24, 10 March, 2005). The BBC’s reports 
and broadcasts were all constructed on the basis of the 
powerful credibility the BBC holds as a global 
broadcaster as a producer of authoritative, informed, 
objective and balanced news and broadcasting. In 
media and television studies, the critique of objectivity 
has rested on the notion of ideology, so that far from 
delivering objective truth, the media’s representation of 
events and subjects is understood as expressing 
particular ideologies through bias and omission (see 
Budner S., and Krauss, E. S., 1995). News reporting is 
criticized for expressing the interests of power, 
especially around social categories such as class, race, 
gender and the state and corporate power rather than 
upholding its avowed ideals. Early forms of critical and 
Marxist-inflected television studies such as that of the 
Glasgow Media Group exemplify this approach 
(Glasgow Media Group, 1976). This kind of work 
unpacks the relationship between the content and 
rhetorical conventions of news presentations so as to 
denaturalize them, showing how objectivity is merely a 
stylistic device, an authoritative, neutral presenting 
style for the reporting of events which effaces editorial 
political choices and biases, presenting news 
information as if the television production and editorial 
process was not introducing a wide range of ideological 
distortions. 
Following media studies, needless to say the 
BBC’s presentation of China is open to a wide-ranging 
possible critique of its content and rhetoric. The non-
news news of China Week was redolent with strong 
editorial decisions which delivered a proscribed range 
of themes and ideas about China through particular 
emphases or omissions, all of which showed China in a 
specific way. China Week might also be open to 
criticism for its occasional deployment of stereotypes 
and clichés about China and Chinese people. Yet the 
traditional media studies critique of news reporting is 
predicated on the assumption that an objective idealized 
truth is in fact possible. This may be a less significant 
issue when, in the example of the Glasgow Media 
Group work the critical goal is necessarily also a 
political one, but in the context of broadcasting about 
China, this issue is more germane. A critique of China 
Week which aimed to show how it was ideologically 
biased assumes that there is a single truthful or correct 
understanding of “China” against which the BBC’s 
could be measured. This critique, therefore, makes a 
counter-appeal to a totalizing knowledge of the “true” 
nature of China, from which the BBC would be accused 
of deviating with inaccuracies and omissions. 
Rather than set up completing claims to know the 
“real” China in a critical response to China Week, the 
Week can be simply described on the basis of its claim 
on knowledge of China. At the level of epistemology, 
rather than rhetorical style, objectivity is a more 
fundamental feature of media reporting, becoming, in 
this broader sense, positivism, or an understanding of 
language which assumes the possibility of producing 
empirical knowledge of social categories which is 
independent of the structuring effect of the language 
that is used to express that knowledge (Shapiro, 1981). 
China Week was informed by the assumption that 
“China” is a bounded and totalizable reality, a singular 
social object which can be accurately reported, 
described and analyzed on the basis of a clear 
distinction between China as a social object and the 
media coverage that is producing an understanding of 
what China is. 
Therefore, out of contemporary China’s pluralities 
and untotalizable realities, the BBC was producing its 
own coherent version of China. It was elaborated like 
those of academia or politics, with styles and registers 
which produced legitimate knowledge - knowledge that 
counts as knowledge - through specific epistemological 
mechanisms. It was structured in terms of temporality 
and had valorized themes. China Week shows how the 
BBC was engaged in an act to produce China as a 
discourse, the BBC’s China. 
The breadth of China Week across the BBC was 
one of its unusual and defining features, giving its 
discursive production a scale not apparent in the more 
normal discontiguous individual news reports. It 
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became, deliberately or otherwise, an institutional 
undertaking which produced different aspects of the 
BBC’s China across the different networks, taking on a 
multiplicity of legitimizing mechanisms. The networks 
and stations were operating within their briefs to 
produce different kinds of knowledge, but which 
together offered the possibility of an encompassing 
knowledge. 
The discursive production of China by China Week 
began with the introductions to the segments. In the 
context of the non-news news characteristic of the Week, 
these functioned as an explicit interpretive layer, 
constructing a delimited set of problematics and themes 
from which the British public could “know”, and know 
that it knew, China. On the 6 O’clock News, the 
newsreader said: 
 
All this week, the BBC has been taking a closer 
look at China. It’s the world’s fastest growing 
economy and this year will overtake Britain. But 
economic liberation has not yet been followed by 
political freedom. In the first of a series of special 
reports for the 6 O’clock News... (BBC1 6 O’clock 
News, 8 March 2005). 
 
This week we’ve reported on how much China has 
changed in recent years, but there’s been little 
reform in one area - religion. Today, religious 
minorities are still closely controlled. (BBC1 6 
O’clock News, 10 March 2005). 
 
Like the other aspects of China Week, the 
introductions are part of the rhetorical strategies which 
began the process of legitimizing the BBC’s authorial 
voice. They were mediating between an imagined 
“British public”, which was assumed, possibly correctly, 
to be largely ignorant about China,iv and the reportage 
segments on television and radio.  
After the introductions, the different networks of 
the BBC produced their distinct ways of knowing China. 
Analogies can be drawn between the kinds of coverage 
across the BBC and the different approaches possible 
from within academic knowledge of China. One can 
map China Week across academic models: Radio Five 
Live was doing ethnography or anthropology, taking in 
local, “ordinary” experiences; similarly on TV, BBC 
News 24 and BBC Breakfast were doing live crosses 
and talking to people in the street. This kind of 
knowledge was legitimized, like anthropology, by 
claims on an authentic, subjective Chinese experience - 
the personal voices of real Chinese people - as the site 
at which we can know China. In contrast, the Radio 4 
spoken word network, the evening television news 
programs and the nightly Newsnight current affairs 
program, and some of the World Service were doing 
political science, sociology or policy analysis - broader 
studies of political and social processes in China. 
Instead of the personal and subjective, this was the 
systematizing effect of abstract analyses, outlining 
themes and offering explanatory models from which it 
could be claimed to know China. The interviews and 
“vox-pops” provide “data” which offers representative 
samples of Chinese lives, and the analysis and in-depth 
constructed reports function as “theory” to make sense 
of the “data”. Radio Five Live spent a morning in a 
small town called Huiwu south of Chongqing, visiting a 
school and presenting descriptive knowledge:  
In the background you can probably hear some 
children, they’re primary school children, exercising in 
what is their only area to exercise, a sort of rather 
scruffy playground … it’s … it’s pretty poor. I am 
looking at a three story building, it’s got the sort of 
white cement on the outside which is rough and in some 
places falling off...” (Radio Five Live, 11 March, 2005). 
BBC News 24 crossed live to Shanghai where the 
journalist interviewed a representative example of 
urban China:  
 
[Journalist] Cheng Yun, who’s 25, and she works 
for L’Oreal, the cosmetics giant. Cheng Yun, 
what’s it like to live in this city? [Interviewee] Oh, 
it’s very nice, I like [it] here, it’s a very dynamic 
city, and a lot of opportunities. … [Journalist] And 
you’ve come down here to do a bit of shopping 
here this evening. [Interviewee] Yes! (BBC News 
24, 7 March, 2005). 
 
Although these “vox-pops” might have been 
analogous to ethnographic knowledge, the 
epistemologies of electronic news are quite specific and 
distinctive from academic knowledge. A social scientist 
might survey a large number of people or analyze 
statistics to produce knowledge while surveys or 
qualitative research with a single subject would not 
count or be legitimate. For journalism, a single 
interviewee is legitimate, and this rests on both the 
assumption that they are representative of a broader 
objective social reality “China’s rural poor”, or “urban 
Chinese youth”, for example, and also that they 
themselves can offer analysis of that social reality 
(Allen, 1999, pp. 36-39). This is an improvisational 
epistemological mechanism in which the journalist uses 
his or her judgment, a “nose” for news, with which to 
assess the assumed representiveness of an interviewee.  
For Newsnight, the 6 O’clock News, and some of 
the segments on BBC News 24 and on radio, their 
contribution to China Week was extended analytical 
reports on topics including politics, the environment, 
the economy, human rights and daily life. In contrast to 
the improvisational and subjective “data” of the live 
coverage, these reports were detailed and structured 
with lines of argumentation: 
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[Journalist] Over the past two decades, China has 
put economic growth above all else, and with two 
hundred million Chinese still living on less than a 
dollar a day, relieving poverty remains vital. Coal 
offers the way out. As the demand for power grows, 
for the time being this means one thing, more 
emissions of climate changing gasses. (BBC2, 
Newsnight, 8 March 2005). 
 
These kinds of reports also use the convention of 
the “expert”, an academic or a government official for 
example, whose analysis is legitimized by the 
institutions of academia or by political power:  
 
[Journalist] But China’s international reputation is 
now a mixed affair. [Expert interviewee 1] China is 
a partner in the fight against global international 
terrorism, and I think that’s won China some point 
in America and around the world … [Journalist] 
When it comes to proliferation, there is one area, 
North Korea, where China has made itself 
essential … [Expert interviewee 2] They have 
absolutely no desire to see a nuclear North 
Korea.(BBC News 24, 9 March, 2005). 
 
Typically, news reporting offers a combination of 
the journalist’s analytic voice, perhaps with the 
legitimizing addition of the expert, and the subjective 
interviewee. On the Newsnight program under the 
subject of democracy: 
 
[Journalist] This week, China announced it’s 
achieved ninety-nine percent democracy. In Tianjin, 
the mayor is trying to breath life into consultative 
bodies that used to simply rubber-stamp party 
decisions. … [Interview with street vendor, 
journalist] Do you think politicians in this city 
actually listen when people like you ask them 
things? [Interviewee] You mean the leaders? I feel 
from my point of view it’s not likely, because 
we’re not important, we’re too small and too far 
way from people with their social status.” (BBC2, 
Newsnight, 9 March, 2005). 
 
In one example, knowledge of China was produced 
self-reflexively, by asking how much British people 
knew about China. The lighter magazine style of the 
Breakfast television program meant it self-reflexively 
includes the viewer, an imagined “ordinary” member of 
the British public, into its discursive production of 
China:  
 
[Host] It produces half of the world’s cameras, a 
quarter of its washing machines, and ninety percent 
of the world’s toys. We’re talking about China’s 
economy which is expanding all the time. … 
[Interviewee] ‘This definitely says Made in 
China … [Journalist] Jo, we’ve looked around your 
house, are you surprised by the number of products 
that are made in China?” (BBC1, Breakfast, 8 
March 2005). 
 
For television, unlike radio, or indeed academic 
knowledge, visuality is the basis of the legitimacy of its 
knowledge. In China Week, visuality functioned as an 
analogue of its whole epistemology. Television 
coverage showed images of Chinese lives in which their 
visual presentation produced the effect of unmediated 
objective knowledge and effaced the meditative 
processes of television production. As Stein has argued 
in the context of the US current affairs program 60 
Minutes, following from Barthes’ critique of the news 
photograph, the visual representation of China in China 
Week is a privileged form of knowledge, unarguable as 
the “real China”. When we see something on television, 
we really know that we know it. The visual “in this 
medium professes to be a ‘mechanical analogue of 
reality.’ ... [its] denotative status and the completeness 
of its analogy, ‘in short its ‘objectivity’,’ lends itself to 
the naturalized state of ideological common-sense” 
(Stein, 2001, p.251). The power of the image is such 
that it functions to produce China as an objective reality, 
powerful enough to overwhelm our awareness of the 
wholly constructed nature of the image by the television 
production processes.  
An example of the power of the visual in China 
Week was a report on the Three Gorges Dam, under the 
theme “Environment”. A long shot took in the 
enormous scale of the Three Gorges Dam project, 
showing the viewer the reality of China’s Promethean 
development and, in the context of the report, the costs 
to the environment. Then, however, the journalist 
intervenes, shown in a shot standing on top of a 
platform so as to survey the construction project. he 
adopts a literal privileged position from which to 
“know” China, and mediate between the “real” China of 
the image and the British viewer. From this position, 
the journalist explains the significance of the Three 
Gorges project: 
 
When this dam is finished, it will be by some 
margin, the world’s largest hydroelectric power 
station … for the Chinese government, that’s 
obviously very good news, that will be cheap, clean 
electricity for China’s surging economy. But there 
is another side to the story of this dam, and that is 
its immense cost...” (BBC1 6 O’clock News, 9 
March, 2005).  
 
Television’s visuality appeals with unique power to 
the possibility of unmediated objectivity, in contrast to 
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radio which by definition makes explicit the meditative 
effects of the reporter on the reality he or she is 
reporting. Radio in this way demands both creative 
imagination on the part of the listener to “picture”, for 
example, the impoverished Huiwu School and a 
recognition of the interpretive role of the aural radio 
medium. In denoting the demand of the listener that he 
or she “picture” China’s reality, radio makes explicit 
the meditative and constructive mechanisms which 
television works equally explicitly to conceal.  
 
Interpretation 
As noted above, the BBC appeared to 
“misrecognize” its own participation in China’s 
discursive production, so that it offered a self-conscious 
interpretation of China for the British public while 
simultaneously deploying the media’s conventional 
rhetorical effects of objectivity. This epistemological 
confusion suggests a failure by the BBC to self-
reflexively understand the nature of its self-ascribed 
institutional task in China Week. It wished to help the 
British public “know the world’s fastest growing 
superpower”, but it did not understand its own role in 
producing “China” as a bounded and structured body of 
knowledge. It self-consciously interpreted China 
through several layers of mediation, but did not appear 
to recognize the operation of its own interpretive effects.   
In this way, China Week was not a creative and 
sustained intellectual act. Instead, the BBC 
unreflectively deployed an appropriated array of 
valorized themes and ideas with which “China” was 
described, explained, and understood. It created these as 
an improvised and porous discourse functioning as just 
a part of the broad Western discourse of China. China 
Week was an assemblage or summation of a range of 
ideas of China, packaged into radio and television 
reportage.  
The improvised nature of China Week was 
evidenced in its unmindful retelling of the long 
engagement of the West with China. This engagement 
could be found in references made by China Week to 
earlier representational tropes. One of the most febrile 
is the apocryphal phrase of Napoleon’s “Beware the 
sleeping dragon for when she awakes she will shake the 
world”. While Napoleon never actually made any 
reference to a waking dragon (Fitzgerald, 1996, pp. 62-
3), it has become one of the longest-standing references 
to a temporalized China, expressing China’s modernity 
and modernization around the notion of its emergence 
from an ahistorical past.  
In China Week, there were only two scripted 
references to China as a waking dragon, one which 
opened the entire week of broadcasting on the Breakfast 
television program and another during the news cycle 
on the 24 hour digital news channel BBC News 24, into 
which China Week reports were inserted at regular 
intervals. However, if this cliché has faded, the BBC 
introduced a new phrase to describe China, “the world’s 
fastest growing economy” which opened almost every 
segment, report and program like a mantra. This phrase 
became the primary rhetorical device for China Week to 
legitimize China as a place which should most interest 
and concern the British public. For the BBC, China’s 
defining and important characteristic is its economy and 
its current high rate of economic growth, rather than, as 
a hypothetical contrast, its ancient and magnificent 
civilization. That this specific measurement of global 
power - annual rates of economic growth - should 
define the meaning of China for the BBC is an 
expression of its implication in the global liberal 
capitalist narratives in which economic statistics have 
become the key structuring principle for global meaning.  
China Week also echoed the 19th and early 20th 
century tropes of China of the “Mysterious East” and 
“Yellow Peril”. Introducing China Week on Radio Five 
Live, the presenter said: “China has emerged as the new 
global superpower with the world’s fastest growing 
economy, but what do we know about this country?” 
(BBC Five Live, 7 March 2005) The answer is, of 
course, perhaps more than any other non-western 
country in the world. China is after all it’s own field of 
scholarship. Similarly with current affairs program 
Newsnight a scripted introduction ran as follows: “This 
question of how the world’s fastest growing economy 
can simultaneously be the world’s biggest Communist 
state is one of the great mysteries about China.” (BBC2, 
Newsnight, 9 March, 2005). China is politically 
authoritarian and economically liberal, of which one 
can find any number of examples, especially in East 
Asia through the 20th century. The “mystery” is not a 
general politico-economic analytical problem, but 
“China” itself. That mystery was evoked in the 
rhetorical style of the presentation, with the presenter’s 
tone of voice functioning as a metaphorical gazing to 
the distant horizons of the Far East. 
BBC China Week also referred to more recent 
meanings for China. In the introductions to some of the 
television segments the BBC claimed it had particular 
access to China:  
 
In a country balancing its Communist ideals 
against the desire to throw open its borders to 
foreign investment … the BBC has been given 
unprecedented access but free broadcasting on 
many issues is still restricted. (BBC News 24, 7 
March 2005). 
 
The notion of “unprecedented access” references 
Maoist China, when traveling to and moving around 
China was, indeed, much more difficult than it is today, 
and it invokes a special claim on knowledge of China as 
a legitimizing strategy for the BBC’s China discourse. 
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In contrast to these traditional orientalist notions of 
China, China Week also made references to the Chinese 
diaspora. During the Breakfast program, in a report on 
the Chinese community in the northern city of 
Manchester, a journalist did a live broadcast from a 
large Chinese grocery supplier:  
 
Good morning everyone from Manchester. We’re 
here as part of the BBC’s China Week, looking at 
the business links between the UK, and between 
the north west, and China. … The store that we’re 
in … is a cash-and-carry store that supplies 
Chinese restaurants … and you’ve got anything 
you could ever want … and of course the 
ubiquitous fortune cookies. (BBC 1, Breakfast, 8 
March, 2005). 
 
Pointing out the fortune cookies acknowledges the 
overseas Chinese migrant, mainly Cantonese, 
communities in the UK. This is an historically-specific 
meaning for China from the 19th and 20th centuries, 
when Chinese migrants settled in the UK and 
established Chinatowns and businesses in food and 
services. This is a very different understanding of China 
from that of the “People’s Republic of China” and 
decades older than the notion of “the world’s fastest 
growing superpower”. These references to the many 
meanings for China point to the ad hoc nature of China 
Week. They were not offered as part of a deliberate 
exposition of the history of the West’s engagement with 
China or Chinese people, but were included as the 
unreflective reproduction of discourses, and perhaps 
even stereotypes.  
However, within this process of discursive 
reproduction, the BBC did present a dominant meaning 
for China, and that was the notion of “transformation”. 
Almost every report was prefaced and structured around 
the idea of China making some kind of social, 
civilizational and, of course, economic leap from one 
state to another.v 
Western ideas of transformation in Asia are long-
established. The model is the West’s reading of Japan 
after the Meiji Restoration and the period between 1868 
and Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 
(Bourne, 1916). Notions of East Asian transformation 
were renewed in the post-war period with Taiwan and 
South Korea, the so-called “Little Dragons” (Vogel, 
1991). The over-determining narrative is modernization 
and, more fundamentally, modernity, and as with these 
earlier expressions of Asian modernity, the 
transformation narrative of China Week became an 
uncritical telling of a story of China’s transition to a 
“modern” society. This in turn reproduced a range of 
unstated assumptions about the “unmodern” point of 
origin in China’s past from which such a transformation 
could begin, and the features and styles by which we 
could recognize that this is a “new China”. 
The markers of transformation for such an 
uncritical narrative in China Week were delimited. The 
unmodern was broadly represented by China’s rural 
poor and the modern by the urban rich. China Week 
temporalized the relationship between the two so as to 
present urbanization as a feature of an “emergence” or 
“rise” of China. It used a doubled structure in a number 
of its reports to show this transition: the poverty of rural 
life was contrasted with a modern urban life in Beijing 
and especially Shanghai: 
 
[video of rural village, pig being prepared for 
slaughter] The way things are done here hasn’t 
changed for centuries. The man of the house should 
be in charge, but Mrs. Xiang’s had to hire in some 
help. Her son is a student at college. Killing pigs is 
not his business. And her husband’s far from home, 
earning money to pay for the university fees. … 
[video of modern urban hair salon] … Eight 
hundred miles away in Shanghai, Gaohui is giving 
herself a very different kind of treat, a little 
pampering at the hairdressers. (BBC News 24, 9 
March 2005). 
 
Often, though, the transformation narrative was 
presented with start and end points which were implicit 
rather than stated in such an obvious way. When the 
presenter said “but economic liberation has not yet been 
followed by political freedom”, a received set of 
suppositions about the nature of social progress was put 
in place: China’s transformation is indicated by the 
creation of particular kind of free-market liberal 
economic regime, and modern China starts with the 
creation of this regime. Then, the transformation of its 
economy sets in place other necessary developments, in 
particular political and social freedom, leading China 
theoretically toward an imagined liberal democratic 
future (see Huntington, 1991, Fukyama, 1992). This 
narrative leaves assumed the point when China’s path 
to modernity, or industrialization began, and where it is 
going: 
 
[Journalist] “Well, we used to have bicycles, now 
we have mopeds, hopefully we’ll soon have cars,” 
he said. China’s following a well-trodden path. 
Korea, Japan and others have industrialized rapidly, 
and all the evidence is that if China’s come a long 
way, it can still go a lot further. (BBC News 24, 12 
March 2005). 
 
In China Week, little of this was made explicit, and 
as noted above, these issues of how to understand China 
were not self-reflexively included in the broadcasts. 
Rather than interrogate what makes China look “new”, 
China Media Research, 3(1), 2007, Harrison, The Media Making Knowledge and Writing History 
        http://www.chinamediaresearch.net                                                         editor@chinamediaresearch.net 23
China’s modernity was identified and presented in a 
received form recognizable to both the British audience 
and the BBC. It was envisioned most strongly by a 
familiar consumer culture, urbanization and modern 
architecture, signified by Chinese people participating 
in China’s consumer boom, for example in modern 
houses, shopping malls, cars and roads, and again and 
again with the illuminated vista of the Lujiazui financial 
district of the Pudong New Area in Shanghai.  
These recognizable signs of the “new China” 
established reference points with which Chinese history 
and futures could be known by a British audience, and 
through which a British audience could also know itself. 
If China is transforming, then Britain is transformed, at 
the end of this imagined future for China, waiting for 
China to catch up, or even overtake the UK. The 
structured nature of this version of China’s path to 
modernity overshadowed other aspects of China’s 
modernization, ones less recognizable to the BBC and 
to a British audience. In particular, with notable 
exceptions such as the story on the Three Gorges Dam 
project, state-sponsored modernization was not a 
feature of China Week, largely excluding the potent 
state and Party visions for China’s future around 
nationalist ideology, the military, infrastructure or the 
space program. China’s transformation in China Week 
was generally showing the emergence of the 
individuated urban consumer as the sign of the arrival 
of this “new China”: 
 
[Journalist] I am walking along one of Shanghai’s 
most fashionable shopping streets, Huahai Rd in 
the centre of the city and it is lined with exactly the 
same trade names that you would see in any major 
Western city. There’s a Pierre Cardin, Adidas, 
Mango, across the road, Episode, Armani, they’re 
all here, and they’re all catering to the new rich of 
Shanghai (BBC Radio 4, The World Today, 9 
March, 2005). 
 
More fundamental than these elisions, the narrative 
of transformation is redolent with politics and the 
politics of history-writing. By structuring their 
knowledge of China in terms of transformation, the 
BBC was actually engaged in the practice of writing 
Chinese history itself. The transformation of the “New 
China” involves trajectories with an imagined historical 
starting point, and imagined end-points, which 
introduces effacements and erasures into its historical 
narratives.  
For China Week, the starting point for China’s 
transformation into “the world’s fastest growing 
economy” was very clearly 1978 and the Third Plenary 
Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, when the 
Chinese Communist Party initiated “reform”: the Open 
Door policy, economic liberalization, and the continued 
dismantling of collectivized (though not state-owned) 
agriculture and industry. In terms of the politics of 
history-writing, if China “began” its transformation in 
1978 then this serves to attenuate and marginalize what 
came before, in this case Maoism. By starting the 
history of the new China in 1978, Maoist China 
becomes merely a point of origin, a singular moment 
with no history of its own and, in particular, no 
continuity with the China of the 1930s and 1940s and 
the contemporary China of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. 
By structuring it around a narrative of transformation 
based on economic growth, the version of Chinese 
history of China Week erased Maoism from Chinese 
history.  
 In one of the live crosses to Shanghai across from 
the Pudong New Area, this erasure was clearly 
expressed: 
 
[Journalist] Hello and welcome to Shanghai, and I 
am on the Bund, Shanghai’s famous waterfront … 
Take a look over there, that skyline seventy years 
ago the most famous in Asia. In those days 
Shanghai was known as the Paris of the East, and 
now many people hope that those glory days are 
coming back again. You look over the river [pan to 
Pudong New Area] and you see some of the 
reasons why. Ten years ago that was marshland ... 
(BBC News 24, 7 March 2005). 
 
In this introduction was a history of China in which 
Mao and Maoist Communism became a void, an absent 
presence, around which Shanghai had deviated away 
from its “natural” status of “glory”.  
It is notable that the narrative of transformation 
articulated by much of the reportage of China Week was 
the use of extreme contrasts - extreme poverty, the 
people “left behind”, the “have-nots” in contrast to the 
urban rich in the major cities. This attenuated the 
possibility of invoking the idea of “ordinary Chinese”, 
people neither especially rich nor poor and people 
whose lives express neither the timelessness of the 
peasant nor the emergence from 1978 of the rich 
consumer, but rather greater continuity in their lives 
over the last few decades that the notion of 
transformation would tend to acknowledge. Similarly 
with the attenuation of the state and the Party from 
China Week, which while still controlling most of the 
economy and being an active presence in Chinese lives, 
does not fit within the transformation narrative and a 
history of China that starts in 1978.  
If the BBC has written a history of China that starts 
in 1978, then the question becomes what are the 
implications of a such a specific and politicized history. 
The danger for the BBC is that in writing Chinese 
history in this way, and being apparently unaware of the 
implications of its own history-writing, or even that it 
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was engaged in such a task, it finds itself aligned with a 
common story about China being told by government 
and business that privileges economic development and 
commercial opportunities and attenuates the both the 
continuing presence of the Communist state, and the 
complexity and continuities of China’s social 
experience as a narrative of change over the whole post-
imperial period. Importantly, this is a version of 
China’s story that the Chinese government itself is also 
telling, as it distances itself from Maoism and 
encourages China’s consumer economy, while 
continuing to secure its position of political authority.  
The history of China which the BBC was 
reproducing was told during China Week itself by a 
representative of the British business community on a 
panel discussion program on Radio 4: 
 
  [Program guest] I think we have to get the big 
picture here. China’s economic miracle over the 
last twenty five years in an event of historical 
proportions. Four hundred, five hundred million 
people have been brought out of poverty over that 
period. We are looking at rates of growth going 
forward of eight, nine percent in the next ten years. 
No other developing country is looking at that 
future at the moment. All these problems, the 
banking sector, maybe a small housing price 
bubble in Shanghai, which of course is only one 
city among hundreds of cities, these problems are 
manageable if growth keeps going, even the 
environmental problems, we know … once a 
certain level of per capita income is achieved these 
start to be solved much more quickly. It’s a 
question of industrialization which China is going 
through right at the moment. (BBC Radio 4, The 
World Today, 11 March 2005). 
 
In understanding the implementation of economic 
reform by the Chinese Communist Party as a “miracle” 
and “an event of historical proportions”, a specific set 
of policies are read as China’s transition to modernity 
starting twenty-five years ago. The narrative deprecates 
China’s previous experiences of modernity and the 
continuities across the 20th century of both its 
economic development and especially its politics. 
Furthermore, it imagines a distinctly old-fashioned, and 
perhaps reassuring, Western modernist vision of 
limitless progress through modernization, in which all 
of China’s problems will be solved by capitalist 
industrialization. The BBC was deeply engaged with 
this way of understanding China and has reproduced it 
very thoroughly in China Week.  
However, it did develop one form of extremely 
important critical response to this overdetermining 
narrative, which was the emphasis on democracy, and 
to a lesser extent, human rights. This theme is not a 
critique of the overall narrative of transformation and 
how it writes and re-writes China’s past and future. 
Indeed, democracy is embedded into that narrative itself 
via development studies and political science: with the 
transformation to a liberal economic regime should 
come the “natural” progression to liberal democracy 
(Huntington, 1991). But democracy and human rights 
was the one issue for the China Week which stood 
between its coverage and the overheated depolitical 
modernist fantasy of China’s progress offered by 
government and business. 
The live panel discussion television program 
Question Time during China Week was centred on the 
theme of democracy and political freedom, and became 
a series of appeals to political reform to match 
economic development. The counter-argument from 
Chinese government representatives on the panel was 
the same appeal to the narrative of economic 
development made by the foreign business person 
quoted above. On Hong Kong’s political future: 
 
[Chinese government representative] I think 
whether you have the Chief Executive Officer 
selected through various kinds of modalities, the 
most important thing we have to keep in mind is 
the prosperity and the welfare of the people there ... 
[panelist] What I find puzzling is this the notion 
that stability and prosperity are somehow 
threatened by democracy …  
[Chinese government representative] Look at all 
this so-called universal suffrage and general 
elections, sometimes the turn-out is less than fifty 
percent … in many countries you want the chance 
to give him a choice whether you have the right to 
vote or the right to have a job … (BBC 1, Question 
Time, 10 March 2005). 
 
Human rights advocates were also given a voice in 
the China Week news reports: 
 
[Journalist] Has the human rights situation 
improved on the ground for people in China? 
[Interviewee] Well, I think in terms of the current 
Chinese leadership clearly the Chinese government 
now does seem to be taking a more positive stance 
on human rights … the basic problem is that these 
fine words are really being implemented on the 
ground and the result is that grass-roots activists on 
the ground have been detained or imprisoned under 
exactly the same charges … as from five, ten, 
maybe fifteen years ago. (BBC News 24, Asia 
Today, 11 March 2005). 
 
The theme of human rights and democracy 
functioned as a constant block to the runaway narrative 
of transformation, such as that expressed by the British 
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businessperson. Yet, as noted above, it was not a 
critical interrogation of China as a discourse, but an 
immanent part of that same transformation narrative 
which the BBC was itself promoting as the way to 
“know” China. The emphasis on democracy and human 
rights was questioning China’s fulfillment of the 
trajectory of liberal capitalist development which the 
BBC constructed as the basis of China Week. Therefore, 
while this theme was important and commendable, it 
still operated within the BBC’s unreflective set of 
assumptions about China’s history and future.  
In the context of the whole of China Week, the 
democracy and human rights theme was the best that 
could be hoped for to offer a challenge to the current 
period of enthusiasm for the “historical proportions” of 
Chinese development. China Week was a laudable 
undertaking, realized with technically high-quality 
reportage and broadcasting, and serving to place China 
in the consciousness of the British media audience. Yet, 
it was delivered without any apparent self-awareness of 
the BBC’s role as a producer of knowledge. The BBC 
was interpreting the Chinese experience and 
constructing specific narratives of Chinese history with 
significant political implications for how China is 
understood, but without a self-conscious awareness that 
interpretation and history-writing were the bases of 
their enterprise. As a result, in the end, China Week 
rehearsed well-established Western narratives of China 
and failed to offer new insights into what China means 
to the UK.  
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i This information was taken from discussion held during a seminar conducted by the author on China Week 
attended by representatives of the BBC, held on May 19, 2005.  
ii ibid. 
iii ibid. 
iv Based on comments by BBC representatives at the China Week seminar. 
v see Fitzgerald, J. (1996) Awakening China for a detailed exposition of the history of the transformation trope from 
the 19th century to the early 20th century. 
